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Starting approximately in the 1960s, large waves of migration from Mexico and the Northern 
Triangle countries - Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala - has resulted in a ‘crisis’ at the US-
Mexico border, where US border enforcement agents are faced with large waves of illegal 
migration. In response, the United States has established over the years a series of policies and 
deterrence mechanisms that have included human right violations, to stop and reduce illegal 
migration. The goal of this paper was to understand the effect of these policies and deterrence 
strategies on migration from Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries, to gauge their 
effectiveness or lack thereof. The results demonstrated that current US policies and deterrence 
strategies are ineffective in achieving their stated objective to reduce/stop large waves of migration 
from Mexico and the Northern Triangle since they actually perpetuate the migration they seek to 
stop. What we find is that current policies and deterrence strategies, combined with the push 
factors, including politics and corruption, poverty, and violence from gang and drug cartels, create 
a cycle of debt migration, where migrants are in such a vulnerable position, that they have no other 
choice but to try and migrate again to the United States. As a result, this paper suggests that the 
United States reevaluate its migration policies, to have a more welcoming approach, to increase 
legal pathways to migration, and to address the root causes in Mexico and the Northern Triangle 
in cooperation with those countries. Without a change in policies, the problem at the US-Mexico 














Looking at the total immigrant population in the United States in 2019, 3.3 million people 
came from the Northern Triangle countries (Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador) while 10.9 
million came from Mexico (MPI 1, n.d). Many within these numbers include families, like that of 
Monterosso and her husband and their three children, who requested asylum in the United States. 
The family explained that “they were willing to do whatever it took” since “going back to 
Guatemala was simply not an option” (Edwards, 2019). This they explained, was because gangs 
threatened to murder their children “if they didn’t pay an exorbitant bribe, five months’ worth of 
profits from their tiny juice stall” (Edwards, 2019). Unfortunately, this scenario is one that is 
experienced by many in Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries (NTCs). These countries are 
home to problems like violence, political instability and corruption, poor socioeconomic 
conditions and poverty. For example, Honduras has a crime index of 76.65, ranking the country 
fifth globally for crime (World Population Review, 2021). The violence experienced stems mostly 
from gang activity and from the drug industry as Honduras is known as a major drug route towards 
the United States due to its weak domestic law enforcement (World Population Review, 2021). In 
El Salvador, the same level of violence is found. The country also faces high unemployment rates, 
low wages, and high levels of petty crimes (World Population Review, 2021). In Guatemala, 
despite having one of the largest economies in Central America, “about 60 percent of Guatemalans 
live in poverty” (Verza, 2018). In Mexico, 42 percent of the population lives below the poverty 
line (Serrano, 2021). The country is also plagued by corruption - Mexico was ranked by the World 
Economic Forum 127 out of 137 in 2017, for corruption (Serrano, 2021). Mexico also experiences 
high levels of violence due to drug cartels, who in 2018, “killed at least 130 candidates and 
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politicians in the lead-up to Mexico’s [...] presidential elections” (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2021).  
As a result, conditions in Mexico and the NTCs leave many no choice but to leave for the 
United States. These migrants usually travel to the US-Mexico border where they enter the country 
illegally. From 2017 to 2019, 201,569 migrants from El Salvador, 502,330 from Guatemala, 
420,302 from Honduras, and 727,000 from Mexico were apprehended at the US-Mexico border 
(Homeland Security, n.d). With this high influx of illegal migrants, the United States has reacted 
by establishing strict immigration policies and deterrence strategies that are based on three primary 
objectives: prevention, removal, and deterrence (National Research Council, 2011, p.41). These 
three objectives are accomplished with the use of visas, screening procedures, physical barriers 
(i.e. fences, border walls), surveillance technology (i.e. cameras, motion detectors), personnel, 
special task forces (i.e. Fugitive Operations Teams), immigration penalties, criminal charges, and 
detention (National Research Council, 2011, p.41-44). To further deter migrants, the United States 
has also relied on human rights violations - such as separating families, brutal detention conditions, 
and sexual and physical abuses in detention centres (Amnesty International, 2018). However, 
according to Massey and Pren (2012), “paradoxical as it may seem, US immigration policy often 
has very little to do with trends and patterns of immigration. Even when policies respond explicitly 
to shifts in immigration, rarely are they grounded in any real understanding of the forces that 
govern international migration” (p.2). This explanation is one that resembles a lot of the discussion 
related to US responses to the migrant crisis that exists today. Indeed, criticism of the US policies 
are prominent in today’s literature, as many criticize its ability to properly address migration (see: 
Fan 2008; Massey, Durand, Pren 2016; Massey, Pren 2012; Johnson, Woodhouse 2018; Abrego 
2009).  
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 Having this in mind, this paper takes a close look at the case study of out-migration from 
Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries, as well as the immigration policies and deterrence 
mechanisms in the United States, in order to attempt to answer this question: are current 
immigration policies and deterrence mechanisms able to stop and/or reduce large waves of 
migration from Mexico and the NTCs? This has lessons for migration and development studies 
overall because, oftentimes, when it comes to dealing with large waves of migration, countries rely 
heavily on the creation of policies and deterrence strategies. Since migration is a phenomenon 
found around the world that impacts many individuals every day, understanding the effectiveness 
or lack thereof of different strategies becomes crucial if we want to avoid unnecessary human 
rights violations, injuries, and deaths. For this reason, this paper argues that US immigration 
policies and border enforcement strategies are unable to achieve their intended goal since they 
actually perpetuate the migration they seek to end. In what follows, I will begin by thoroughly 
examining the root causes of migration in both the NTCs and Mexico. Next, I will discuss the 
different US immigration policies and deterrence mechanisms that have been implemented over 
the years, examining their stated objectives and the ways in which they were and are implemented. 
The paper will end with a discussion reflecting on the results of these policies and deterrence 
strategies, and will finish with recommendations which call for a complete reorientation of today’s 
US immigration policies. 
THE ROOT CAUSES OF MIGRATION 
Despite having average scores in key indexes that measure development: Human 
Development Index (Mexico: 0.779, Honduras: 0.634, El Salvador: 0.673, Guatemala: 0.663), 
GDP growth (Mexico: -0.1, Honduras: 2.7, El Salvador: 2.3, Guatemala: 3.8), Gini Index (Mexico: 
45.5, Honduras: 52.1, El Salvador: 38.6, Guatemala: 48.3), etc., if we look at politics and 
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corruption, poverty, gang/drug cartels and violence, the situation is much different than what those 
numbers portray (UNDP, n.d; The World Bank, n.d, ‘GDP Growth’, and ‘Gini Index’). Indeed, 
migration from Mexico and the NTCs is a result of a combination of factors that, together, make 
it so that many feel the need to leave their homes. 
Politics and Corruption 
In Guatemala, following a civil war lasting 36 years (1960-1996) between government 
forces and left-wing guerilla groups that resulted in “more than 200,000 people [...] killed [...] 
more than half a million [...] driven from their homes, and many more [...] raped and tortured”, the 
country transitioned to a democracy beginning in 1980 (Bracken, 2016). A democratic constitution 
was officially adopted in 1985 and the first democratically elected government in 1986 (Taft-
Morales, 2019). However, the following years were far from democratic as government 
representatives were year after year implicated in corruption scandals. For example, former 
presidents Alavor Arzu (1996 to 2000), and Alfonso Portillo (2000 to 2004) were both indicted for 
embezzlement and/or money laundering (Pineo, 2020, p.11; The Associated Press, 2018; Weiser, 
2013). The US attorney on the case even explained that Portillo was being charged for basically 
“converting the office of the Guatemalan presidency into his personal A.T.M” (Weiser, 2013). 
More recently, former president Alvaro Colom (2008-2012) is accused of a US$35 million fraud 
case, president Otto Pérez Molina (2012-2015) is accused of being part of a US$65 million customs 
and tax fraud ring, while president Jimmy Morales (2016-2020) is currently being investigated for 
fraud (Pineo, 2020, p.11-12). This corruption has resulted in distrust, with “more than 72% of the 
population [having] little or no trust in the police, and about 65% [having] little to no trust in the 
government” (Taft-Morales, 2019, p.3).  
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 In El Salvador, a 12 year civil war plagued the country from 1980 to 1992. The war was a 
result of economic inequality and political exclusion, as the country was controlled by a few 
wealthy families (CJA, n.d). This system was challenged by the Salvadoran people, especially in 
1932, when the peasants rose up against dictator General Maximilian Hernandez Martinez, who 
responded violently, killing 30,000 (CJA, n.d). Eventually, in 1980, decades of political violence 
turned into a full-scale civil war (CJA, n.d). The Salvadoran people had enough, and desperately 
wanted change. The war was fought between the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and 
the government of El Salvador. The war resulted in an estimated 71,629 deaths and was marked 
by numerous human rights violations, kidnappings, torture, disappearances, massacres, and 
corruption (Green, Ball, 2019, p.782; Allison, 2012). Unfortunately, despite the end of the war, 
corruption remains prevalent in Salvadoran politics as former president Francisco Flores (1999-
2004) was charged with stealing earthquake relief funds, president Tony Saca (2004-2009) is 
currently in prison for embezzlement, president Mauricio Funes (2009-2014) is facing corruption 
charges, and current president Nayib Bukele (2019 - to present) although not facing any charges 
yet, is suspected to be part of payouts to gang leaders (Pineo, 2020, p.13). 
 In Honduras, the country was historically ruled by the military, but eventually, the country 
transitioned to a democracy in 1981. Unfortunately, as democracy was strengthening, everything 
came to a halt in 2009, as president Manuel Zelaya (2006-2009) was the victim of a coup. The 
coup was executed by the military who were “claiming that he [Zelaya] was considering exploring 
a bid for reelection, something that was not at the time lawful in Honduras” (Pineo, 2020, p.13). 
Prior to the coup, president Zelaya was actually well liked by Hondurans as he was making 
progressive social and economic reforms (Gordon, Webber, 2013, p.34). Free school enrollment, 
higher salaries for teachers, increased minimum wage, and the support for the legalization of some 
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narcotics were all products of his time as president (Gordon, Webber, 2013, p.34). Unfortunately, 
the coup drastically resulted in a giant step backwards for both the country and democracy, as 
military and police forces renewed their presence, and corruption spread due to a weak judicial 
system that allowed crimes and human rights violations to remain unpunished (Salomon, 2012, 
p.58). Indeed, the following two presidents since Zelaya, have both been accused of criminal 
activity. President Porfirio Lobo Sosa (2010-2014) was accused of misappropriating government 
funds and of money laundering, while current president Juan Orlando Hernandez (2014 - present) 
is accused of being part of a drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracy (Human Rights 
Watch, 2020).  
 In Mexico, the country experienced a ‘one party democracy’ for 71 years (1929-2000). As 
the ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) plagued Mexico with rampant 
corruption (Shelley, 2001, p.215). The system was characterized by politicians bribing constituents 
for their votes in an attempt to get reelected. This forged an important relationship between 
politicians and the wealthy elite, who would use this dynamic to benefit each other (Nieto, 2012, 
p.25). Indeed, in the mid-1980s, a survey found that “over 70% of those questioned [agreed] that 
the payment of a bribe was necessary when dealing with the government” (Morris, 1999, p.625). 
Further, in 1995, another survey found that “88% of respondents [claimed] that corruption was 
widespread” with “62% [admitting] that at times it was necessary to bribe in order to resolve a 
problem, while 53% agreed with the statement that ‘it is so difficult to comply with laws and 
regulations that at times there is no other way but corruption?’” (Morris, 1999, p.625). In more 
recent years, corruption under Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) and Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018) 
has been the highlight of today’s newspapers, as both Presidents have been accused of bribery with 
drug cartels (Llorente, 2019).  
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Essentially, such a political environment results in underfunded state institutions and 
programs, it limits the government’s ability to respond to natural disasters, food insecurity, and 
other types of crisis, essentially affecting the general population, who is left dealing with problems 
like poverty on their own (Wilson et al, 2019, p.5).  
Poverty 
In the NTCs and Mexico, poverty exerts itself mainly through malnutrition, poor living 
conditions, low employment opportunities and wages, reliance on remittances and unreliable 
markets, and poor education rates. Unfortunately, many are facing more than one issue at a time. 
For example, Guatemala is plagued by malnutrition with almost half of its population unable to 
afford the cost of basic food staples which has resulted with a national growth stunting rate of 
46.5%, with that number reaching over 70% to 90% in poorer areas, while in Honduras, 48% suffer 
from malnutrition (WFP, 2020; Cross, 2015). In terms of poor living conditions, in El Salvador, 
one in six live in homes with dirt floors, while it is estimated that 1.8 million Mexicans are still 
living without electricity (Pineo, 2020, p.14, p.5; Mexico News Daily, 2019). In terms of 
employment and salaries, one of the biggest issues in the NTCs and Mexico is the reliance on 
informal employment, which often results in significant social health inequalities, increased 
poverty, and poor health (Lopez-Ruiz et al., 2015). In El Salvador, 69.14% (2019) of the 
population partakes in informal employment, while 60% of Mexico’s working force does the same 
(Statista, n.d; ILO, 2014). Another significant issue contributing to poverty is the reliance on 
unreliable markets and remittances. In Guatemala, the top exports are bananas, raw sugar, coffee, 
nutmeg, mace and cardamom, and palm oil (OEC, 2020). Similarly, Honduras relies heavily on 
the production of coffee, sugar, and bananas (Pineo, 2020, p.15). These primary resources are often 
highly sensitive to environmental changes, and prone to unreliable production rates. Many issues 
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found in this sector are droughts, rust, pests, low prices, etc. If we look specifically at coffee in 
Guatemala, rust recently affected more than 70% of the farms, leading to 1.7 million coffee 
workers losing their jobs (Taft-Morales, 2019, p.18).  
In terms of remittances, since informal employment and low wages are the norm, many are 
forced to rely on migration to support their income. Remittances represented over 10% of 
Guatemala’s GDP, 20% in El Salvador, 21.5% in Honduras, and 3.1% in Mexico (Taft-Morales, 
2019, p.18; WFP, 2021, p.1; The World Bank, n.d, ‘personal remittances’). Another important 
problem in the NTCs and Mexico is a poor education rate. In El Salvador, one-third are not 
educated past the third grade and less than 1/10 will ever attend college classes (Pineo, 2020, p.15). 
In Guatemala, 1 in 10 people are illiterate, half of the population has only a primary education, 
and less than 1/10 of the labour force has a university degree or higher (Orozco, Valdivia, 2017, 
p.1). Similarly, in Honduras, 1 in 10 people are illiterate, and 63% of the labour force only went 
to primary school (The Dialogue, 2017, p.1). In Mexico, “more than a million children, or about 
13% of children in school age, do not attend classes because they cannot afford it” (Cullmann, 
2018). A poorly educated person is more likely to have a low income and low-quality job, a more 
precarious economic situation, and has a higher risk of having health issues such as work-related 
injuries. Combined with the corruption described previously, which underfunds state institutions 
and programs, and limits the government’s ability to respond to crisis and problems like 
malnutrition, migrating to the United States for better jobs and higher wages becomes the only 
way out of poverty.  
Gangs and Drug Cartels 
In the NTCs and Mexico, violence represents another threat that pushes migrants to the 
United States. In the NTCs, there are two gangs that are notorious for their crimes - Barrio 18 (M-
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18) and Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13). Both gangs are of US origin, as they were created around 
the 1960s and 1980s respectively, in Los Angeles by the sons of migrants from the NTCs 
(Fogelbach, 2010, p. 420). Eventually the gangs established themselves in the Northern Triangle 
as members were deported from the United States (Fogelbach, 2010, p. 420). Today, there are an 
estimated 50,000-85,000 active members in the NTCs (Pineo, 2020, p.16). Members are usually 
men coming from poor families who were recruited at a young age or who decide to join as a 
means to escape poverty and unemployment (Pineo 2020, Fogelbach 2010). Indeed, research on 
youth perception of violence in Honduras found that unemployment and poverty were major 
drivers of violence. For example, Alejandro, a youth who was interviewed, noted the importance 
of violence to benefit one’s economic status, stating: “Oh, sure there is a benefit to violence. The 
majority of acts, like assaults, are so a person can improve their economic situation. They steal a 
lot of money and material things that have value, for this” (Williams, Castellanos, 2020). The 
Northern Triangle is also home to smaller gangs - called pandillas who also commit crimes and 
violence. Together, the gangs have changed the NTCs into extremely dangerous countries - with 
murders, petty crimes, and extortion the most common offences committed. For example, gangs 
in Honduras received approximately US$200 million every year from Honduran citizens (Pineo, 
2020, p.16). Similarly, in El Salvador, 7 out of 10 small businesses are forced to give monthly 
payments to the gangs (Pineo, 2020, p.16). These expenditures can be especially challenging to 
poor families, whose salaries barely cover their basic expenses. In terms of murders, a report from 
Médecins Sans Frontières (2018) found in 2017 that approximately 150,000 people have been 
killed in the last ten years from gang activity in the NTCs (p.8). Additionally, when asked if they 
never feel safe at home, the report found that 57% of Hondurans, 67% of Salvadorans, and 33% 
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of Guatemalans answered yes (p.10). In the NTCs no one is sheltered from gang violence, even 
children and the elderly are at risk. 
In Mexico, violence is a product of drug cartels. This problem began in the 1980s as 
Colombian drug cartels would hire Mexicans to traffic their drugs into the United States; however, 
eventually Mexico developed cartels of its own (Kellner, Pipitone, 2010, p.29-30). Their success 
mostly started in the 1990s as a result of prominent Colombian drug cartel leaders such as Pablo 
Escobar and others, being arrested or killed, opening up the market to Mexican cartels (Kellner, 
Pipitone, 2010, p.29-30). As earnings increased in the mid 1990s, violence followed as drug gangs 
started fighting for more territory and control. Today, the most prominent drug organizations in 
Mexico are the Sinaloa Cartel, the Jalisco New Generation, The Gulf Cartel, and Los Zetas Cartel 
(BBC News, 2019). Although Mexican presidents have been fighting to eradicate drug cartels 
since their inception, the drug war truly began in 2006, when President Felipe Calderon took office. 
From 2006 to 2012, president Calderon “deployed tens of thousands of military personnel to 
supplement and, in many cases, replace local police forces he viewed as corrupt” (Lee et al, 2019). 
The result was rather catastrophic and ineffective in addressing the drug problem. Indeed, “with 
an army trained and licensed to kill on the streets replacing the police, drug cartels controlling 
large parts of the territory, and total impunity for reported crimes, terror took a grip on the country 
and its people” (Laurell, 2015, p.249). The army took advantage of that impunity and committed 
many crimes and violated the rights of many. For example, in 2014 alone, the military and police 
were responsible for the disappearance of 43 students, the murder of 6, and the injury of 25 in 
Iguala, and a massacre of 22 civilians in Tlatlaya (Williams, 2019). Further, a report from Amnesty 
International (2016) found that women were being tortured, abused, assaulted and harassed both 
sexually and physically, during interrogations and arrests linked to the drug war. At the same time, 
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the drug cartels retaliated to Calderon’s efforts with bloodshed and even more violence, as “squad-
sized units of the police and Mexican army [were] tortured, murdered, and their decapitated bodies 
publicly left on display” (Kellner, Pipitone, 2010, p.31). Further, the rate of drug-related murders 
since 2006 continued to increase, with total homicides in Mexico rising by 90% from 2006 to 2009 
(Basu, Pearlman, 2017, p.2). Today, it is estimated that the war on drugs has “claimed nearly 
300,000 lives over the past 14 years” while “another 73,000 persons have gone missing” (David,  
2020). Since no one is ever truly protected from drug gangs, these conditions have installed a 
tremendous sentiment of fear in Mexico. A survey reported that “the proportion of adults who feel 
their state of residence is unsafe rose 49% in 2004 to 61% in 2009” (Basu, Pearlman, 2017, p.1). 
The situation remains very similar to this day. 
Relation to Migration 
In the NTCs and in Mexico, it is not surprising that corrupted politics, poverty, gangs, and 
drug cartels have resulted in mass migration to the United States. With 594,100 migrants (legal 
and illegal) in the United States in 1960, to over 14 million in 2019, conditions have clearly not 
improved as people continue to migrate (MPI 1, n.d). For the most part, migrants leave due to a 
combination of factors (Pineo, 2020). Indeed, Capps et al (2017) found in a survey on a Honduran 
group that they had left because of violence and insecurity, as well as for better opportunities and 
living conditions (p.18). Another survey also found that the majority of those interviewed stated 
violence, insecurity, and the search for better opportunities and living conditions as their reason 
for migrating (Capps et al, 2017, p.18). Similar results were found by Cornelius for both Mexican 
migrants and those from the NTCs (2018, p.13). Another report by Kennedy (2014) found through 
interviews with child migrants from El Salvador that about 60% of them fled the country because 
of gang threats and violence. Similarly, a report from Médecins Sans Frontières (2017) found that 
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39.2% of interviewees from the Northern triangle “mentioned direct attacks or threats to 
themselves or their families, extortion or gang-forced recruitment as the main reason for fleeing 
their countries” (p.5). Lastly, in a 2017 survey of 120 households, the findings revealed that the 
primary reasons for emigration for Guatemalans was loss of agricultural production, lack of work 
opportunity for Hondurans, and violence and insecurity for Salvadorans (Capps et al, 2017, p.17). 
Research also demonstrates that push factors (corruption, poverty, and gang/drug cartels) are the 
leading factors for emigration rather than the pull factors (what is pulling people towards a 
destination) (Pineo, 2020; Capps et al, 2017). In other words, without the push factors, many would 
most likely remain in their home country.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature discussing migration from Mexico and the NTCs to the United States, 
focuses mainly on the migration policies and the root causes of migration. Those who focus on the 
migration policies either believe that US immigration policies and deterrence mechanisms are 
successful, or they argue otherwise. Those in the first category usually follow a more state-security 
model and tend to analyze specific policies and their specific effects at the border (Alden 2017; 
Amuedo-Dorantes et al 2013; Hoekstra, Orozco-Aleman 2017). For example, the work of Hoekstra 
and Orozco-Aleman (2017) looks at Arizona SB 1070 and demonstrates how that policy led to a 
decrease in migrants at that specific point on the border where it was implemented. The article 
does not consider, however, other factors that led to the decrease in migrants, such as the diversion 
to other points at the border.  
 The second category of scholars, those who argue that the current US immigration policies 
and deterrence mechanisms are unsuccessful tend to follow a human security model and observe 
the crisis from an array of angles (Warren, Kervin 2017; Massey, Pren 2012; Richard 2018; Fan 
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2008; Bacon 2014). In this area of research, the key themes explored are: cycles of debt-migration, 
push-pull factors, diversion versus deterrence, the creation of a detention system, the importance 
of addressing root causes of migration, and more. Scholars in this category also discuss the policies 
through a human rights perspective, with a focus on international law, NGOs and humanitarian aid 
(Alonso, Nienass 2016; Androff, Tavassoli 2012; Ataiants et al 2018; Seyal 2020). For example, 
Ataiants et al (2018) look at how migrant children’s rights are being violated at the US border. 
Androff and Tavassoli (2012) look at the criminalization and death of migrants, as well as the 
criminalization of humanitarian organizations (i.e. Humane Borders, Samaritans, No Mas 
Muertes) as violations of human rights and international law. I situate my paper with scholars in 
this category, since I believe that to truly understand a situation, one must look at the complete 
picture. 
 The literature focused on the root causes looks at why people are choosing to leave, the 
type of migration, and the migrant demographic. Those who research push-pull factors, typically 
look at the effects of poverty, corruption, politics, conflicts, gangs and drug violence, and 
environmental problems (Pineo 2020; Taft-Morales 2019; Cantor 2014; Cruz 2015; Brenden et al 
2017; Franklin 2014; Aguila et al 2012). For example, Pineo (2020) demonstrates the correlation 
between migration and politics, poverty, and gang activity in the Northern Triangle. Those who 
focus on the type of migration (legal versus illegal) typically research why migrants decide to 
migrate the way that they do, and the effects of those migrating patterns (Orrenius, Coronado 2017; 
Gutiérrez 2019; Schmidt, Buechler 2017; Ryo 2013). For example, Schmidt and Buechler (2017) 
conducted research on the decision-making process of women migrants from the Northern 
Triangle to migrate to the United States. In terms of migrant demographic, a lot of new research is 
looking at the shift in migration trends - from mainly men migrants, to families, women, and 
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unaccompanied children (Ghosh 2019; Acuna 2018; Bruno et al 2014; Stinchcomb, Hershberg 
2014). Some research also explores the relationship between migration and US involvement in 
Mexico and the NTCs (Laurell 2015; Teichman 2019; Wise 2019; Bull 2016). These articles tend 
to argue that the United States has a responsibility to help address the root causes of migration 
because of their prior involvement. 
 Other  relevant research areas exist with respect to illegal migration. For instance, the 
economic side of migration tends to address the concept of remittances, the use of coyotes, cycle 
of debt migration, etc. (Johnson, Woodhouse 2018; Massey, Durand, Pren 2016; Heidbrink 2019; 
Abrego 2009). Research on health, tends to focus on the physical and psychological effects of 
migration and of US policies (Linton et al 2018; Jusionyte 2018; Chambers et al 2021). Other 
research explores the risks associated with migration, looking at crimes occurring during 
migration, such as trafficking, smuggling, kidnapping, etc., and also the violence at the border 
(Sarabia 2020; Brenden et al 2017; Menjivar, Abrego 2012). Some scholars discuss the perception 
of migrants in the United States, showing the relationship between US perception and the creation 
of policies (Correa-Cabrera, Garrett 2014; Campbell 2014). Lastly, some research also focuses on 
how migration should be addressed moving forward, with different suggestions ranging from open 
borders, human security models, state security models, addressing root causes of migration, etc 
(Vietti, Scribner 2013; Restrepo et al 2019). As is clear, there is a wide range of literature on this 
topic.  
METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this paper was to study current literature to formulate an analysis of the situation 
at the US-Mexico border. This paper is entirely based on secondary data, collected from scholars 
and key organizations in relevant fields. The substantial part of the paper is based on peer-reviewed 
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sources, which were collected using different research tools such as Novanet and Google Scholar. 
To supplement the peer-reviewed articles, this paper also used important data such as statistics, 
interviews, personal stories, and news coverage, which were acquired using search engines such 
as Google. The purpose of this data was to support the ideas found in academic research and to 
portray a more realistic picture of the issue. Overall, the selection of sources was based on their 
relevance to the topic, the credibility of the authors, and the quality of the source. This ensured 
that this paper used sources that were appropriate, reliable, and accurate.  
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Now that we know why migrants are migrating, it is important to understand why large 
numbers of migrants are choosing to migrate illegally. One example is the Bracero program, which 
was established in 1942 as a result of labour shortages during the Second World War. The program 
allowed Mexican workers to work in the agricultural sector in the United States, temporarily. This 
allowed American companies to fulfil their employment needs, and offered jobs to Mexicans 
peasants who were desperate for work. The program was deemed valuable to Mexican workers, 
with the number of contracts signed reaching 4.6 million from 1942 to 1964, with many workers 
returning more than once on different contracts (Bracero History Archive, 2021). Unfortunately, 
the United States terminated the program in 1964, due to concerns about the treatment of workers 
and possible abuses of the program, despite “vociferous objections from Mexico” (Massey, Pren, 
2012, p.2). With scarce work opportunities in Mexico and reduced legal pathways to migration, 
combined with Mexicans relying on the program to sustain their livelihoods, the sudden 
termination of the program had severe consequences. Indeed, Mexico went from having around 
450,000 guestworker visas in addition to about 50,000 resident visas per year, to no guestworker 
visas and only 20,000 resident visas (Massey, Pren, 2012, p.3). Thus, migration from Mexico to 
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the United States did not end following the termination of the Bracero program, but rather, 
continued under illegal circumstances. For instance, in 1965 - when the program ended - 
approximately  40,000 illegal Mexican migrants were in the United States. In 1977 - nine years 
following the end of the program - there were approximately 460,000 illegal Mexican migrants 
(Massey, Pren, 2012, p.28). In the 1970s-1980s, migration from the NTCs also started to increase, 
and these migrants were met with the same restrictions (20,000 resident visas annually), forcing 
many to also migrate illegally (Massey, Pren, 2012, p.9).  
US POLICIES AND DETERRENCE STRATEGIES 
In 1994, the Prevention through Deterrence policy (PTD) came into effect in response to 
illegal migration. PTD are policies focused on pushing migrants away from safe migrating routes 
into rugged and remote desert areas (Boyce, Chambers, Launius, 2019, p.24). For example, one 
area where migrants are pushed is the Sonoran desert, which is extremely mountainous, and is 
home to extreme temperatures ranging from -3.9C to 38C. It also lacks vegetation and water 
sources, and is home to rattlesnakes, centipedes, and scorpions. Essentially, it was assumed that 
this policy would create such difficult experiences that it would inevitably discourage individuals 
from attempting to migrate to the United States. Operation Gatekeeper (1994) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996) were key policies that resulted in 
thousands of agents hired, a first wall built, dozens of checkpoints established near all land and 
maritime borders, and increased penalties which allowed the deportation of migrants who 
committed crimes, including those who were legally in the country (Budd, 2019; Miller, 2017).  
In the early 2000s, policies focused on deporting illegal migrants were created, such as 
Operation End Game (2003), Operation Stonegarden (2004), Operation Return to Sender (2006), 
Operation Rapid REPAT (2007), and Secure Communities Program (2008). From 2003 to 2008, 
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just over 7 million migrants were deported to their country of origin (Homeland Security, 2019). 
Additionally, more deterrence focused policies were created in the mid 2000s. This included the 
Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (2005), the Secure Border 
Initiative (2005), Operation Streamline (2005), Operation Jump Start (2006), Secure Fence Act 
(2006), and the Southern Border Security Act (2010). These policies increased surveillance 
equipment and support infrastructure, money spent at the border, patrol agents, and severe 
penalties (Massey, Pren, 2012 ; CRS, n.d). For example, a new technology called SBInet system - 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), aerial assets, a remote video surveillance camera system, and 
sensors - was implemented costing over $1 billion (Homeland Security, 2005; O’Neil, 2017). 
Further, looking at the budget increase, in 2005, the budget for US Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was $9.7 billion, reaching $17.3 
billion in 2010 (American Immigration Council, 2021, p.3). If we look at personnel, there were 32 
thousand CBP officers, Border Patrol Agents, and ICE agents in 2005. That number reached 47.1 
thousand in 2010 (American Immigration Council, 2021, p.4). In 2011, the United States created 
a new system called the Consequence Delivery System (CDS). Policies under this system are 
similar to those created before, however, they differ in the sense that they seek to increase the 
penalties associated with illegal migration by actively punishing, incarcerating, and criminalizing 
those who do so, rather than relying entirely on deterrence (Slack et al, 2015, p.109). Policies and 
strategies in this program include: Operation Streamline, the Alien Transfer and Exit Program, 
Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security, Voluntary Return, Warrant of 
Arrest/Notice to Appear, Expedited Removal, Reinstatement of Removal, and Standard 
Prosecution (Capps, Hipsman, Meissner, 2017). This resulted in 3.7 million individuals 
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apprehended from 2011 to 2016 (Homeland Security, 2017). Since then, about 500,000 immigrants 
are detained in detention centres each year (Detention Watch Network, n.d).  
Under the Trump administration, in 2017, Executive Order 13768, and 13767 meant more 
resources were given to border protection resulting in an additional 10,000 immigration officers 
and 5,000 border patrol agents (Commission on Immigration, n.d). An increase in the severity of 
penalties and a higher detention capacity in detaining facilities were also part of these orders (Surge 
Initiative) (American Bar Association, n.d). More importantly, they resulted in the construction of 
a border wall - Trump’s biggest promise during his campaign. Although he promised to build a 
wall stretching along the 2,000 mile border, only about 365 miles of new border wall had been 
built since 2017 (Bailey, Rodgers, 2020). Prior to that, 354 miles of barricades (for pedestrians) 
and 300 miles of anti-vehicle fencing were in place at the southern border. Today, the wall 
measures a total of 734 miles in length, with 378 miles of border wall under construction or planned 
(Bailey, Rodgers, 2020). In 2018, the Zero Tolerance Policy was created which allowed the 
Department of Justice to prosecute “all adults [...] apprehended crossing the border illegally, with 
no exception for asylum seekers or those with minor children” (Kandel, 2021, p.1 of the summary 
section). Since adults are required to be detained in federal criminal facilities, where children are 
not permitted, this led to numerous family separations. This resulted in approximately 8,000 family 
units being separated (Amnesty International, 2018, p.6). Today, an estimated 545 children have 
still not been able to find their parents - 60 of which were under 5 years of age when separated 
from their parents (Dickerson, 2021). Separating families is a deterrent strategy that discreetly 
started in 2017, before the policy was officially introduced. Both prior and during the policy, 
family separations were poorly documented, making the reunification of families nearly 
impossible. The reason for this was simply that “the Trump administration had no plans to keep 
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track of the families or ever reunite them” (Dickerson, 2021). Reunification became difficult as 
many adults were prosecuted and deported without regard for their children, who were still in the 
United States. According to the Human Rights Watch, “no federal law or regulation requires 
children to be systematically separated from extended family members upon apprehension at the 
border, and there is no requirement to separate a child from a parent unless the parent poses a threat 
to the child” (Bochenek, 2019). As a result, the Zero Tolerance policy violates important human 
rights protected under international law, such as the right to family unity, the right to liberty, the 
right to freedom from torture and other ill-treatment, to name a few (Amnesty International, 2018, 
p.7).  
This is not the only policy that violates human rights, international law, and US obligations. 
Violating one of the most important principles of international refugee law, the prohibition of 
refoulement, is the Trump administration’s implementation of “an illegal de facto policy of 
pushbacks [...] along the entire US-Mexico border at official US border crossing” (Amnesty 
International, 2018, p.5). This meant that asylum-seekers were forced to queue on the Mexican 
side of the border, a region prone to criminal activity and where migrants are at risk of being 
arrested and deported by Mexican immigration officials (Amnesty International, 2018, p.5). 
Instead, the United States is required by law to interview asylum-seekers to assess “the risks of 
persecution or torture that they may face upon return” (Amnesty International, 2018, p.5). Another 
example is the ‘safe third country’ agreements the United States signed with Mexico, and the 
NTCs. A ‘safe third country’ agreement is signed based on the fact that both countries are able to 
offer asylum to migrants in need. As a result, migrants who pass through those countries - NTCs 
and Mexico - to get to the United States, are required to first request asylum in those countries 
(unless they are fleeing from prosecution in said country). Otherwise, once they reach the United 
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States, they will be sent back to the first ‘safe third country’ they reached. These agreements are 
violations under US and international law because they are not “uniformly safe [countries] for all 
asylum-seekers” (Amnesty International, 2018, p.6). Other than policies, other disturbing 
deterrence strategies that grossly violate the human rights of migrants exist. For example, from 
January 2010 to July 2016, the Department of Homeland Security received 33,126 complaints 
(from migrants about officials) of sexual and physical abuse in detention centres, but only 
investigated 57 (Saadi et al, 2020, p.189). In terms of treatment, a report that questioned over 7,000 
asylum cases, found that one-third reported poor conditions, treatment, or medical issues when 
they were detained. The issues reported were related to food and water (61.8%), hygiene (34.5%), 
and the inability to sleep, overcrowded conditions, confinement, and cold temperatures (45.6%) 
(Saadi et al, 2020, p.190). These immigration policies and deterrence strategies not only are 
problematic, but also do very little to reduce or stop migration.  
 For example, prior to the launch of Operation Gatekeeper, border-crossing deaths were in 
decline from 1990 to 1994. However, following the first phase of the operation, “yearly deaths 
more than doubled between 1994 and 2005, reaching 472 deaths in just 2005 alone” (Fan, 2008, 
p.702). Additionally, a study by Massey, Durand, and Pren (2016) noted that “from 1986 to 2008 
the undocumented population of the United States grew from three million to 12 million persons, 
despite a five-fold increase in Border Patrol officers, a four-fold increase in hours spent patrolling 
the border, and a 20-fold increase in nominal funding” (p.1). Today, there are an estimated 7.3 
million unauthorized migrants from Mexico and the NTCs living in the United States (MPI 2, n.d). 
Meanwhile, the death count is estimated by No More Deaths (n.d), a humanitarian organization 
based in Arizona, to be ten times Border Patrol’s claim of 7,805 deaths from 1998 to 2019 (p.5). 
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In other words, the “soaring death rates and unabated migrant traffic [show] that people [are]  
paying the ultimate price rather than being deterred” (Fan, 2008, p.702-703). 
 With migration routes diverted to harsh terrain, and with the creation of harsher penalties 
when apprehended, many migrants rely on the help of coyotes, who are guides that smuggle people 
across the border. Indeed, the use of coyotes increased from 70% in the 1970s to 100% by 2010 
(Massey, Durand, and Pren, 2016, p.13). Unfortunately for migrants, the use of coyotes is both 
risky and expensive. Extortion, abandonment, kidnapping, and death are common risks associated 
with coyotes (Gilardi, 2020). Additionally, today the cost of a coyote reaches upwards of US$8000 
per individual (Johnson, Woodhouse, 2018, p.978). Since these migrants have relatively low 
incomes, many rely on loans to cover their expenses - putting their property as collateral. For 
example, Johnson and Woodhouse (2018) recount the story of Jose: 
Jose is trapped. Like many from his hometown of Cajola, Quetzaltenango, Jose set out 
north with the goal of improving his family’s economic circumstances. And like many, his 
pursuit of economic stability led to hardship and turmoil. Jose’s debt stemmed from two 
attempts to reach the US. On the first in the early 2010s he was captured outside of Tucson, 
Arizona and deported to Guatemala, losing the Q20,000 down payment for his trip (per a 
unique arrangement with his coyote). His first failure eventually led to a second attempt, 
this time through Texas, where he was caught by the Border Patrol and sent back bearing 
an additional Q20,000 in debt to the same lender. Back home in Cajola, Jose watched the 
10% monthly interest on his loans, borrowed against his house, push his cumulative debt 
to roughly Q80,000 (~US$10,500). At the time of our interview Jose was three months 
away from defaulting on his combined loans. Non-payment would result in the seizure of 
his home by the moneylender. Faced with weighty debts, mounting interest, and the threat 
of dispossession, Jose was reluctantly beginning to conclude that a US wage was his only 
way out: ‘This is what I’m contemplating right now… I don’t know how I’m going to get 
out of this … I don’t know how. But I’m thinking of going again” (p.985). 
The cycle of debt migration experienced by Jose is unfortunately the situation experienced by 
many other migrants. Those who do make it in the United States and find work get to pay back 
their loan and support their household with their American salary. Those who get apprehended, 
detained, deported, and/or who die during their journey, face much harder circumstances which 
extend to others in their lives. For example, Jacobo, a former migrant, explained “many people 
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spend three months in detention centers in the United States and the interest on their loans keeps 
running, in those three months. They come back for a month or two and try to return again, which 
means another two or three months. Now they’re almost a year since the first trip... By then the 
interest is almost equal to the principal” (Johnson, Woodhouse, 2018, p.987). This is exactly what 
happened to Julio, a 14-year-old unaccompanied migrant who was detained for over five months 
after migrating to support his household financially after two years of failed corn crops. Unable to 
work, the interest on his loan he and his family took to pay for his journey continued to increase, 
leaving his family in an even more dire situation (Heidbrink, 2019, p.270-271). Indeed, US policies 
that inflict harsher penalties - like detention/jail time - drastically affect migrants’ abilities to pay 
back their loans. As a result, migrants have no other choice but to migrate again, with a US wage 
their only option out of debt. Indeed, a Guatemalan from Patzun noted that farmers earned about 
Q40 a day [~US$5.00], meaning that paying off a Q200,000-300,000 debt is near impossible 
(Johnson, Woodhouse, 2018, p.990). Many other stories confirm this, like Eduardo who 
demonstrated the desperateness felt by many, as he explained that “if [migrants] don’t make it the 
first time, they look for a second or third loan. And finally, when you owe Q100,000, Q120,000 
your life is worthless. Then you just throw yourself at the border” (Johnson, Woodhouse, 2018, 
p.991). Or the story of Manuel, who was apprehended and deported five times before he finally 
made it inside the United States, with a debt of about US$30,000 (Johnson, Woodhouse, 2018, 
p.990). Or the story of Rodrigo, who after two failed attempts, a debt that increases and that is 
threatening his family’s land, and only a fourth-grade education, explained that he has no other 
choice but to try again, otherwise, his family will “suffer and die, maybe not tomorrow but the 
next month or next year. This is not a choice” (Heidbrink, 2019, p.267). This all starts with a lack 
of legal pathways for migration, deterrence strategies forcing the use of coyotes and loans, and 
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harsh penalties causing debts to increase substantially. As a result, rather than deterring migration, 
current immigration policies are giving those who get apprehended, no other choice but to migrate 
again, to escape the extreme debt that can only be paid with US wages. For this reason, current 
immigration policies are ineffective in achieving their stated objectives as they perpetuate the 
migration they seek to end.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Moving forward, I believe the United States should focus on establishing a human security 
model by eliminating their deterrence strategies that push migrants towards harsh terrain - the 
leading cause of injuries, deaths, disappearances, and the use of coyotes. Reorienting migration 
towards safer routes will both reduce debts (created by using coyotes) and reduce deaths, injuries, 
and disappearances. The United States should also increase pathways towards legal migration. 
Creating a guest-worker program - like the Bracero program - or providing permanent 
employment-based visas would significantly decrease illegal migration. This would be a good and 
viable option for the United States, who in 2018, “had 6.7 million job openings and just 6.4 million 
available workers to fill them” (Cox, 2018). I believe that together, these changes will create a safe 
environment which will push migrants to seek legal migrating routes. Lastly, I believe the United 
States should increase its cooperation with Mexico and the NTCs in addressing the root causes of 
migration. Whether it is by funding the work of NGOs or training lawyers and judges, addressing 
the root causes of migration will drastically reduce the number of migrants attempting to reach the 
United States.  
Thus, if the United States seeks to have better control of illegal migration, changes are 
necessary. I recognize that it will not be easy, but it is essential, as current immigration policies 
perpetuate the migration it seeks to end. Push factors combined with immigration policies make it 
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so that migrants have no choice but to leave. The cycle debt migration the system creates needs to 
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